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1. Introduction 
The Skaraborg Hospital Group (SkaS) is the first hospital group in the Nordic Countries that 
has added Six Sigma on a large scale to its quality programme to improve care processes 
(Lifvergren et al. 2010). Unlike many change efforts in the healthcare sector that are neither 
successful nor sustainable (Chakravorty 2009; Øvretveit 2009, 1997; Thor et al. 2007; 
Zimmermann and Weiss 2005), the success rate of improvement projects in the programme 
in this period was 75%, in some respects due to lessons learned from this particular project. 
Still, the high success rate of the programme might be surprising, given the fact that the 
presumed success of planned or programmatic change has been seriously questioned in a 
number of articles and books (Alvesson and Svenningson 2007; Beer et al. 2000; Beer et al. 
1990; Dawson 2003; Duck 1993; Kotter 1995; Schaffer et al. 1992; Strebel 1996). It is argued 
that organizations are not rational entities where people do as they are told and follow the 
latest strategic ‘n-step model’ –on the contrary, organizational change is to a high degree 
seen as contextual and processual, unpredictable and beyond the realms of detailed plans 
(Alvesson and Svenningson 2007; Dawson 2003; Stacey 2007). The culture and history of the 
actual organization define what strategies for change are possible. What may work in one 
organization might be impossible to carry out in another. In other words, improvement 
strategies seem to be notoriously difficult to transfer between organizations.  
Change and improvement is about learning and apparently, organizations seem to have 
difficulties to learn. Furthermore, daily problem solving activities may inhibit organizational 
learning (Tucker et al. 2002). It is difficult for organizations to recognize and capitalize on 
the learning opportunities posed by operational failures (Tucker 2004) and the how-aspect 
of learning is vital in this respect (Tucker et al. 2007).  Creating arenas for learning in a non-
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punitive climate is thus critical and the role of the managers is essential in this respect 
(Tucker et al. 2007; 2003). Consequently, we see learning as a crucial perspective in change 
and improvement programmes. A better understanding on how learning can be facilitated 
in organizations is thus essential. 
In this chapter, we describe how an enhanced focus on learning through ‘learning 
mechanisms’ (Docherty and Shani 2008; Shani and Docherty 2008, 2003) has contributed to 
the high project success rate of 75% in the Six Sigma programme at SkaS. We present the 
analysis of a traditional Six Sigma project that failed initially, but eventually led to an 
enhanced approach emphasizing learning. This entailed a refocusing on actively planning 
for learning within and between projects – ‘learning by design’– involving the integration of 
cognitive, structural and procedural learning mechanisms (Docherty and Shani 2008; Shani 
and Docherty 2008, 2003). The ensuring success from utilizing learning mechanisms inspired 
us a) to redesign the Six Sigma roadmap –DMAIC, incorporating an ‘L’ for ‘learning 
mechanisms’ – DMAICL, b) to establish permanent arenas for learning between 
organizational units and, c) to institutionalize parallel learning networks consisting of 
specially educated improvement managers that support and facilitate local improvement 
projects. We suggest that learning mechanisms can provide a useful framework to the how-
aspects of learning (Tucker et al. 2007) when designing organizational change initiatives that 
leave room for the cultural and historical contexts inherent in every organization. 
We will first, however, give a brief overview of Six Sigma before moving on to the 
theoretical underpinnings of this chapter – cognitive, structural and procedural learning 
mechanisms. The concept of learning mechanisms is explored in some detail, connecting 
theories of organizational learning to learning mechanisms, thus elucidating the application 
of the mechanisms as a way to enhance organizational learning. These theories are then 
positioned in relation to theories of individual learning and of improvement cycles in 
quality improvement.  
The context of the project is then described in some detail; SkaS, the Six Sigma quality 
programme, and the actual emergency ward (EW). We then describe the actual 
improvement project and its initially failed results before moving on to the project analysis 
using an action research approach. We then present how lessons learned from the analyses 
were used to integrate learning mechanisms in the Six Sigma programme, thus contributing 
to its high project success rate. In particular, we present how the analysis contributed to a 
successful re-take on the project. We conclude with some proposals that might be valuable 
to other healthcare organizations facing the difficulties of larger change initiatives and, 
finally, provide some suggestions for further research.  
2. Theory and background 
2.1. Six Sigma 
There are many definitions of Six Sigma in the literature. Antony et al. (2007) defines Six 
Sigma as “a process-focused data driven methodology aimed at near elimination of 
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defects in all processes which are critical to customers” (p. 242). According to Harry and 
Schroeder (2000) “Six Sigma is a disciplined method of using extremely rigorous data-
gathering and statistical analysis to pinpoint sources of errors and ways of eliminating 
them” (p. 23). Recent research also points to the parallel organizational structure that 
supports improvements within Six Sigma (Schroeder et al. 2008; Zu et al. 2008). Based 
on case study data and literature, Schroeder et al. (2008) more specifically define Six 
Sigma as “an organized, parallel-meso structure to reduce variation in organizational 
processes by using improvement specialists, a structured method, and performance 
metrics with the aim of achieving strategic objectives” (p. 540). This definition also 
captures some of the elements that distinguish Six Sigma from TQM —the role structure 
and the structured improvement procedure (Zu et al. 2008). The role structure is often 
referred to as the ‘belt system’ and could be seen as a way to standardize the 
improvement competences in an organization. The black belt role signifies a co-worker 
with advanced improvement knowledge, working fulltime as an improvement expert. 
The structured improvement procedure – DMAIC (Define-Measure-Analyze-Improve-
Control) –is used to solve quality problems of greater complexity and with unknown 
root causes (Schroeder et al. 2008). The Define phase identifies the process or product 
that needs improvement, while the Measure phase identifies and measures the 
characteristics of the process/product that are critical to customer satisfaction. The 
Analyze phase evaluates the current operation of the process to determine the potential 
sources of variation for critical performance parameters. Improved process/product 
characteristics are designed and implemented and cost/benefit analyses are carried out 
in the Improvement phase and, finally, the solutions are documented and monitored via 
statistical process control methods in the Control phase (Dahlgaard and Dahlgaard-Park 
2006; Schroeder et al. 2008). Iterations of the procedure are sometimes necessary but 
also desirable for successful project completion.  Significant for this and other 
descriptions of the DMAIC roadmap is the instrumental approach oriented towards 
tools and procedures (see e.g. Antony et al. 2007; Dahlgaard and Dahlgaard-Park 2006; 
Schroeder et al. 2008; Zu et al. 2008). However, the how-aspects of learning in the 
improvement cycles are seldom explored or described (Antony et al. 2007; Dahlgaard 
and Dahlgaard-Park 2006; Schroeder et al. 2008). 
2.2. Using learning mechanisms to enhance organizational learning 
Unquestionably, organizational learning has been described, defined and studied in 
many ways and from different theoretical angles (e.g. Argyris 1999; Argyris and Schön 
1978; Crossan et al. 1999; Dixon 1999; Friedman et al. 2001; Garvin 2000; Hedberg 1981; 
Senge 1990; Weick 1995). Many psychologists maintain that only people can learn, 
though organizational theorists refer to ‘organizational learning’ by attributing the term 
to observable changes in the structures, procedures and formal frameworks of the 
organization, expressed in such documents as policies, strategies and value statements, 
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when theses changes can be clearly related to preceding events and developments in the 
organization.  
Many studies have shown that learning at work, like learning in formal educational 
settings, is a matter of design and not evolution (Docherty and Shani 2008; Ellström 
2006, 2001; Fenwick 2003; Shani and Docherty 2008, 2003). That is, it is a matter of 
organizing the workplace, not only for production, but also for supporting learning at 
work. Most studies of learning at work focus on individual workers. Crossan et al. 
(1999) provide a ‘4 I’ framework that links individual learning (Insight), through 
networks of collective or group learning (Interpretation and Integration) until it meets a 
senior management group whose decisions make important changes in the organization 
(Institutionalization), that is termed ‘organizational learning’. Shani and Docherty 
(2008, 2003) use the term ‘learning mechanisms’ for the preconditions that are designed 
to promote and facilitate individual, collective and organizational learning. They use 
three main categories; cognitive, structural and procedural. Cognitive mechanisms are 
concepts, values and frameworks expressed in the values, strategy and policies of the 
organization and, ideally, underpin the practice-based learning processes at different 
organizational levels. Structural mechanisms are organizational infrastructures that 
encourage practice-based learning. An example would be lateral structures that enable 
learning of new practices across various organizational units. Finally, procedural 
mechanisms concern the routines, methods, and tools that support and promote learning, 
e.g. the introduction and, eventually, the institutionalization of a new problem-solving 
method. Learning mechanisms in practice may include more than one of these 
components, e.g. both structural and procedural (see e.g. Lifvergren et al. 2009 for an 
application of learning mechanisms in healthcare). In other words, learning mechanisms 
aim to encourage individual and collective learning eventually leading to 
organizational learning. 
Thus, individual learning is a prerequisite for organizational learning. Without doubt, 
individuals can learn and learning takes place in iterative action/reflection cycles (or loops). 
Moreover, researchers who maintain that organizations can learn relate this directly to 
human learning, i.e. the learning of organizational members (Argyris and Schön 1978; 
Huzzard and Wenglén 2007; Kolb 1984; Shani and Docherty 2003).  
Argyris and Schön (1978) take their departure from the concept of ‘single – and double loop 
learning’, where the former refers to our adaption of activities without questioning the ‘a 
priori’ – our taken-for-granted assumptions. Consequently, the latter signifies the alteration 
of our preconceptions in order to act or behave in new ways (ibid. 1978; but also Argyris 
2001; Huzzard and Wenglén 2007).  
Kolb (1984) pictures learning in an iterating four-phase cycle (or, rather, spiral), where 
learning is depicted as the interplay between theoretical knowledge that leads to activities 
(experiments), generating new experiences. These experiences further inform reflection, 
leading to new knowledge.   
Improving ‘Improvement’ by Refocusing Learning:  
Experiences from an –Initially- Unsuccessful Six Sigma Project in Healthcare 27 
2.3. Learning cycles in continual improvement 
Beyond doubt, there is a close connection between theories of learning and the improvement 
cycles of quality improvement. At the core of every quality programme, including Six 
Sigma, lies the concept of Continual Improvement, CI, in which learning cycles (or loops) 
should be used in every problem solving process (Bergman and Klefsjö 2010; Bergman and 
Mauleon 2007).  
Already in the 1930s, Walter Shewhart proposed that mass production could be seen as 
constituting “a continuing and self-corrective method for making the most efficient use of 
raw and fabricated materials” (Shewhart 1939, p. 45). By repeating the steps of specification 
–production – inspection in a continuous spiral, a circular path representing ‘the idealized 
state’ could be reached.  Deming (1986), inspired by Shewhart, proclaimed that the 
management should construct “an organization to guide continual improvement of 
quality”, in which a four-step cycle, the ‘Shewhart-cycle’, should be utilized (p. 88). In other 
writings by Deming, this cycle is referred to as the PDSA-cycle (Plan, Do, Study, Act), see 
e.g. Deming 1994, where ‘Act’ also signifies reflection and learning. Similarly, Joseph Juran 
highlighted the importance of quality improvement, meaning “the organized creation of 
beneficial change” (1989, p. 28). All improvement should take place “project by project”, 
where a project is defined as a “problem scheduled for solution...” (ibid., p. 35), and in 
which recurrent learning cycles should be applied.  In Japan, the concept of CI, partly 
inspired by Juran and Deming (see e.g. Bergman and Klefsjö 2010), has been deeply 
ingrained in quality initiatives since the 1960s. Imai elucidated ‘kaizen,’ signifying “ongoing 
improvement involving everyone, including both managers and workers” (1986, p. 3) using 
the continuation of the Deming wheel: “Japanese executives thus recast the Deming wheel 
and called it the PDCA wheel (Plan, Do, Check, Act), to be applied in all phases and 
situations” (ibid., p. 60). According to Imai, the concept of Kaizen has been the most 
important and distinguishing feature of the Japanese quality movement. The DMAIC 
roadmap of Six Sigma shares the same origin from Shewhart and can be seen as an 
extension of the PDSA cycle and an enhanced version thereof, often used in the Japanese 
improvement descriptions, the QC-story (Bergman and Klefsjö 2010, Smith 1990). Evidently, 
Shewhart as well as Deming brought forward the importance of learning in the iterating 
PDSA cycles of today’s CI, emphasizing the importance of action as well as reflection on the 
action (Bergman and Mauleon 2009, 2007). 
3. Method 
3.1. Action research  
In this project, an action research approach has been used. Action research could be 
described as an orientation to inquiry where the intention to improve the studied system is 
achieved by designing iterative action-reflection loops involving both the researchers and 
the practitioners in the workplaces involved in the projects. The research question usually 
stems from problems that need to be solved in the studied organization.  In action research 
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projects, researchers and co-workers share a participative community, in which all the 
members are equally important in generating actionable knowledge. Co-workers are thus 
considered to be co-researchers in the inquiry process. The purpose of action research 
projects is mainly twofold; to generate actionable knowledge that help to solve the local 
problem, but also to contribute to the body of generalized knowledge (Bradbury and Reason 
2008). Two project workshops were used in this research, see section 5, where a co-
generative model inspired by Greenwood and Levin (2007, p. 93) and Lewin (1948, p. 143-
152) was used.  
Emanating from the action research framework already described, a co-generative dialogue 
starts out from a distinct problem definition where outsiders, in this case the project mentor, 
the development director and an insider through mutual reflection and learning try to solve 
the problem. The solutions are formulated and tested using iterative reflection-action loops 
to further enhance the creation of opportunities for learning and reflection.  
4. The context: The Skaraborg Hospital Group and the Six Sigma quality 
programme 
4.1. SkaS 
The Skaraborg Hospital Group, (SkaS), is situated in the Western Region of Sweden and 
serves a population of 260 000 citizens. The group consists of the hospitals in four towns, 
Lidköping, Skövde, Mariestad and Falköping. The services offered by SkaS include acute 
and planned care in a large number of specialties. In total there are more than 700 beds 
and around 4500 employees at SkaS. There are two emergency wards (EW) in two 
separate hospitals at SkaS. Each ward is responsible for all aspects of acute care in its 
constituency. 
SkaS have a long tradition of quality development using different types of quality 
improvement approaches, such as TQM, organizational audits, small scale improvement 
cycles, the Collaborative Breakthrough Series (IHI 2003). Still, in 2005 it was unclear if the 
many improvement efforts contributed to the realization of the overall quality strategy. In 
many cases, poor formulation of project goals made it difficult to assess whether the 
improvement initiatives had failed or succeeded. Furthermore, the economic outcomes from 
different improvement efforts were not measured. Drawing on these experiences and inspired 
by a pilot Six Sigma project in 2005 (Lifvergren et al. 2010) the senior management team 
decided to add Six Sigma to the SkaS quality methods tool box. Six Sigma would contribute to 
the quality strategy by systematically searching for and reducing unwanted variation in 
critical healthcare processes, and by sustaining an even flow in the processes. More than 50 
black belts have been trained at SkaS in the period from 2005 to 2010. Half of them now work 
as fulltime internal consultants leading various improvement efforts at SkaS.  
SkaS also initiated an action research collaboration with Chalmers University of Technology 
in 2006 to explore how Six Sigma can be embedded in a healthcare setting and to improve 
the DMAIC-roadmap to better correspond to healthcare process improvement.  
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4.2. The initial project at the emergency ward 
From a patient’s perspective, long patient waiting times at emergency wards (EW) are 
unacceptable. Studies have shown that the mean patient Length of Stay (LoS) at an EW 
correlates to increased morbidity and mortality (Sibbritt and Isbister 2006). At one of the 
EWs at SkaS, the LoS was increasing during 2005. An analysis revealed that about 16 000 
patients were treated that year. The average LoS at the EW during the first six months was 
2.7 hours. Furthermore, the variation in LoS was also significant. Nearly 10% of patients had 
a LoS of five hours or more, and almost 20% had a LoS of more than four hours.  
To address the problem the owner of the emergency process at the EW - the manager of the 
surgical clinic - decided to start an improvement project in the spring of 2006, aiming to 
decrease the mean LoS by 20 minutes, thereby increasing patient satisfaction and safety, 
improving working environment and improving resource utilization. A reason for this 
initiative was that LoS at EWs was a topic that appeared frequently in the national patient 
safety discourse. The project group consisted of interested co-workers at the EW and was 
led by two internal black belts.  A steering committee consisting of the medical and surgical 
clinical managers was established. The first line managers responsible for the different 
clinics in the emergency department followed the project.  
The daily operations of the EW are admittedly complex. About 16 000 cases pass through 
the department each year,  and each patient is unique. Some patients must receive 
immediate treatment in the EW, while others’ treatment is less pressing. The inflow of 
patients varies from week to week, depending on such factors as the weather (e.g. 
slipperiness in the streets), epidemics (e.g. influenza) in the population and healthcare 
articles in newspapers. The EW is also heavily dependent on a well-functioning 
collaboration with other units –primarily the x-ray department and the laboratory unit –to 
achieve an even flow through the department. The complex operations sometimes lead to 
increased LoS, which is worrying, tiresome and potentially dangerous to the patients. A 
high inflow of patients also contributes to a stressful working environment. In addition, 
increased LoS put a higher demand on the resources at hand. When there is an 
accumulation of patients due to different bottlenecks, the tail of the patient flow has to be 
handled late at nights at a higher cost. 
The EW is organized under the surgical clinic; nurses and assistant nurses are employed at 
the EW whereas the doctors responsible for the EW come from the medical and the surgical 
departments following a scheme for emergency duty. There are two on-duty lines; the 
primary doctor on duty (usually a resident) works together with front line staff at the EW, 
whereas the secondary doctor (a senior physician) is on standby duty, always reachable by 
phone and obliged to appear within 20 minutes at the ward if called for. 
The DMAIC roadmap of Six Sigma was used to assess the emergency process in order to 
detect root causes explaining the long waiting times. Several tools and methods were used; 
process analysis of the patient flow, e.g. how the inpatient clinics responded to a request to 
admit a patient; analyses of different lead times in the process, e.g. patient in need of x-ray. 
 
Total Quality Management and Six Sigma 30 
Interviewing members of the project group, the information flow in the departments was 
also analyzed. The most important reasons for prolonged LoS were: 
a. Patients that should be admitted had to wait too long for the doctor’s examination;  
b. the waiting times for patients in need of x-ray were too long;  
c. patients with fractures had to wait too long for pain-relieving treatment;  
d. the communication between doctors and other co-workers at the EW was poor;  
e. new residents were not introduced to the procedures used at the EW and;  
f. there were no clear rules for when the secondary doctor on-call should be contacted. 
With these root causes in mind, several improvements were suggested and implemented, 
e.g. nurses should be allowed to remit the patient for x-ray in case of suspected hip fractures 
and they should also be permitted to give pain-relieving treatment to these patients without 
consulting a doctor. A common routine for the improved communication between different 
categories of staff was created. In addition, a mandatory introduction program for intern 
doctors was developed in which important routines at the emergency ward were taught. 
The proposed solutions were shared with co-workers including the physicians at regular 
work place meetings. The results of the proposed solutions were monitored using control 
charts, continuously assessing the overall LoS. Random inspections were also used to make 
sure that the proposed solutions were implemented. 
5. Results and analysis of the project 
5.1. Initial results show no improvement 
Surprisingly, the LoS at the EWwere not affected at all but appeared to increase during the first 
three months after implementation of the suggested solutions by the initial Six Sigma project. 
It was the only one of eight on-going projects during 2006 that did not produce any positive 
results (Lifvergren et al. 2010). In order to learn from the initial failure, a deeper analysis of the 
project was carried out to reveal the causes of the failure and to improve the conditions for 
future projects. The development director (Svante Lifvergren) initiated the analysis. Two 
workshop dialogues, inspired by the co-generative model, were carried out. The purpose of 
the dialogues was to reveal the reasons to why the project had not succeeded so far. In the first 
workshop the development director, the supervisor of the Six Sigma program and one of the 
project managers participated. The second workshop also included the clinical manager and 
the assistant clinical manager at the surgical department, the other project manager and the 
manager at the EW. The results of the dialogues were also discussed with the outsider 
researchers, in this case Bo Bergman. Several plausible reasons explaining the failure of the 
project could be agreed upon (see figure 1). 
The causes could be categorized into two groups; ‘failure of implementation’ and 
‘insufficient analysis’. These groups where then subdivided according to the figure and the 
relations between the different subgroups were visualized using arrows, thus showing the 
believed cause and effect relations between the subgroups. Each subgroup was further 
investigated using ‘5-why’ in repetitive root cause analyses, depicted below (Table 1). 
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Subgroup(s) Root cause analysis Probable root causes 
Poor project 
information at 
the EW and Lack 
of commitment 
Lack of commitment among the ward manager, the 
physicians and the co workers »» (due to) poor 
knowledge of the usefulness of the project »» poor 
information about the project »» the information about 
the project from management was insufficient »» the 
management did not realize that the information had 
not reached all co workers »» poor management 
knowledge of the importance of project 
communication and how this should be accomplished 
/visual engagement from management in project was 
lacking 
1. Management knowledge 
of the importance of project 
communication and how this 
should be accomplished was 
lacking 
2. Poor management 
knowledge of the importance 
of physically being involved 
and showing engagement in 
the project 
Poor support for 
the local project 
group 
The project group lacked authority »» strong informal 
leaders didn’t commit to/support the project (co-
workers at the EW as well as physicians) »» 
management was not able to convince key personnel 
about the importance of the project »» management 
did not realize the importance of recruiting key 
personnel to the project group or to communicate to 
informal leaders about the project »» the project 
managers also lacked this knowledge »» not enough 
focus on project stakeholder issues early on in the Six 
Sigma education at SkaS 
3. Not enough focus on 
critical project stakeholder 
issues early on in the Six 
Sigma education  
Other methods 
not exploited 
Project managers lacked knowledge of and experience 
from other methods and concepts, e.g. lean, discrete 
simulation, Design for Six Sigma etc. »» to learn the 
DMAIC-roadmap was time consuming »» project 
managers lacked time to study other methods  »» the 
education was too compressed and did not contain 
other methods  
4. The Six Sigma education 
was too compressed and did 
not contain other methods as 
well 
True root causes 
not found 
Data and risk analyses insufficient »» no actual root 
cause analysis from data »» insufficient amount of 
data »» project scope too large »» not enough time to 
gather data »» the project mentor did not give enough 
support to the project managers in helping them 
delimiting the scope of the project but also in 
suggesting alternative methods »» poor 
communication between mentor and project managers 
and inexperienced mentor 
5. The project mentor did not 
give enough support to the 
project managers in helping 
them delimiting the scope of 
the project but also in 
suggesting alternative 
methods 
6. Poor communication 
between mentor and project 
managers  
7. Inexperienced project 
mentor and project managers 
 
 
Table 1. Root cause analyses in the different subgroups 
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Figure 1. An affinity diagram from the workshops displaying probable causes of the, initially, failed 
project 
6. Integrating learning mechanisms into the SkaS quality programme 
Although only this project initially failed in its impact on the operational units concerned 
during 2006, we believe that it was the most successful through its impact on the hospitals’ 
development strategy and procedures, especially regarding the design and integration of 
learning mechanisms – cognitive, structural and procedural – into the ongoing quality 
program at SkaS. The lessons learned were used to redesign the Six Sigma solving process –
cognitive and procedural mechanisms. Moreover, the causes to the failure so far have been 
shared in parallel networks –a structural mechanism. Finally, templates to be used in future 
projects also have been designed to prevent the mistakes to reappear in the SkaS quality 
programme (Table 2). This also led to a second, successful project in the EW. 
6.1. Cognitive learning mechanisms 
Cognitive mechanisms provide language, concepts, models, values and theories for 
thinking, reasoning and understanding learning issues. Some examples would be models 
and approaches for improvement, company value statements but also strategy documents 
(Shani & Docherty 2008, 2003; Docherty & Shani, 2008). In this case, the analysis of the failed 
project revealed both the absence of reflection during the project, and also the negative 
impact of no reflective feedback being shared with and among co-workers at the actual 
workplace – the how-aspect of learning (Tucker et al. 2007). The lessons learned inspired us 
to redesign a) the SkaS quality system elucidating the importance of management 
commitment, and b) a revised Six Sigma roadmap –DMAIC, incorporating an ‘L’ for 
learning and reflection –DMAICL (see figure 2). In the Learning phase, the project manager 
and the members of the project group conjointly reflect on the project process in order to 
‘improve the improvement processes’. Moreover, the sixth phase adds important time to the 
delivery of the solutions in the daily operations of management; this was indicated by 
earlier Six Sigma project experiences. The DMAICL roadmap has been used in every black 
belt and green belt project at SkaS since 2006 and could thus be seen as an 
institutionalization of a learning mechanism throughout the organization (Crossan et al. 
1999). The importance of iterations of the DMAICL- cycle has also been highlighted at SkaS. 
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Root causes of the failed project Solutions integrated into the SkaS 
quality programme 
Type of 
learning 
mechanism 
1 Management knowledge of the importance 
of project communication and how this 
should be accomplished was lacking 
a) Feedback to top management and a 
revision of the SkaS quality system 
highlighting the importance of 
management involvement  
b) Revised templates for the problem 
solving procedure  
 
Cognitive, 
structural and 
procedural 
2 Poor management knowledge of the 
importance of physically being involved and 
showing engagement in the project 
Same as above Cognitive, 
structural and 
procedural 
3 Not enough focus on critical project 
stakeholder issues early on in the Six Sigma 
education 
a) A stakeholder template was 
incorporated into the ‘DMAICL’ 
roadmap 
b) The importance of stakeholder 
involvement was elucidated in the Six 
Sigma education 
Cognitive and 
procedural 
4 The Six Sigma education was too 
compressed and did not contain other 
methods as well 
Revision of the education; Lean and 
Design for Six Sigma were added to 
the Six Sigma education and the 
education was prolonged 
Cognitive 
5 The project mentor did not give enough 
support to the project managers in helping 
them delimiting the scope of the project but 
also in suggesting alternative methods 
a) A revised problem solving 
procedure –DMAICL – was 
established 
b) Revised templates for delimiting 
projects 
Cognitive and 
procedural 
6 Poor communication between mentor and 
project managers  
a) Accelerating learning through the 
establishment of parallel learning 
structures at SkaS 
b) Revised templates for project 
communication 
Structural and 
procedural 
7 Inexperienced project mentor and project 
managers 
Same as above Structural and 
procedural 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The integration of lessons learned from the failed project into the SkaS quality programme 
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Figure 2. The improved DMAICL–cycle currently used at SkaS  
6.2. Structural learning mechanisms 
Structural mechanisms concern organizational, technical and physical infrastructures that 
enhance learning, e.g. different feedback and communication channels, arenas/forums and 
networks for dialogue, but also specific learning structures such as parallel learning 
structures. 
As a result from the analysis of the actual project but also drawing from other parallel 
project experiences at SkaS (Lifvergren et al. 2010, 2008), horizontal permanent arenas for 
learning have been established. In these forums, project managers and quality coordinators 
from different organizational units meet every month to learn from improvement ‘successes’ 
and ‘failures’. Improvement efforts are monitored and analyzed in order to learn how to 
improve the ‘project process’ itself. From these network activities, important learning is 
spread throughout the hospital; e.g. project groups and project mentors can learn from each 
other. Also, sharing the ‘L’ from every project inspires reflection and second loop learning 
between projects. Moreover, an intranet project database displaying concluded as well as 
ongoing and future improvement projects has been established. 
A parallel learning structure has been instituted –integrating the selection and training of 
operational personnel to conduct the Six Sigma projects in operational units. Many return to 
their units, while others after further training, become internal consultants (cf. Bushe and 
Shani 1991). 
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6.3. Procedural learning mechanisms 
Procedural mechanisms pertain to the rules, routines, procedures and methods that can be 
institutionalized in the organization to promote and support learning, e.g. assessment 
methods and standards (Docherty and Shani 2008; Shani and Docherty 2008). In this 
particular case, the cognitive and procedural mechanisms overlap, where roadmap 
templates to be used in every larger improvement project support the new cognitive model 
DMAICL (figure 2).  
6.4. A second and successful retake on the project using learning mechanisms 
The problem with long LoS persisted, so a new improvement project was initiated in 2008. 
Learning from the root cause analyses of the failed project, the clinical manager was 
deeply involved in the project, supporting it and requesting regular feedback on its 
progress; the project was subdivided in to several subprojects. Even more emphasis was 
put on continual and regular project communication to involve all co-workers at the EW. 
All these efforts are examples of procedural learning mechanisms. This resulted in several 
improvement suggestions from the front line staff. Moreover, expert knowledge on flow 
theory in daily operations was brought to the project – a cognitive learning mechanism. 
Much effort was also invested in involving and motivating the physicians. Finally, an 
improved DMAICL roadmap –signifying cognitive and procedural mechanisms –was 
followed (see figure 2). As a result of all these efforts, the project managed to reduce mean 
LoS at the EW by 20 minutes during 2008, an improvement that has been sustainable 
during 2009 and 2010. 
7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have described how a deeper analysis of a project that initially failed its 
client has led to emphasizing learning and integrating learning mechanisms into the SkaS 
Sigma programme, thus contributing to the present project success rate of 75% (Lifvergren 
et al. 2010).  
In every improvement programme, the concept of Continual Improvement (CI) plays a vital 
role. At the core of CI, we find the learning cycles – PDSA, PDCA, DMAIC – critical to joint 
sensemaking (Weick 1995) and learning that creates actionable knowledge (Bradbury and 
Reason 2001, 2008). This particular project has disclosed how the importance of learning has 
been played down in the DMAIC roadmap in favor of more instrumentally emphasized 
problem solving techniques, e.g. templates, project charters and statistical analyses 
(Anthony et al. 2007; Schroeder et al. 2008). The experiences presented here have led to the 
addition of an ‘L’ in the roadmap, DMAICL, thus highlighting the original intentions of the 
learning cycles that somehow got lost on the way (Deming 1986; Shewhart 1939). We further 
propose that the ‘L’ might signify cognitive and procedural learning mechanisms, the 
intention of which is to invoke second loop learning within and between project groups and 
operational units.  
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Moreover, through the use of learning mechanisms, a design approach to 
institutionalization can be adopted (Crossan et al. 1999; Shani and Docherty 2003), including 
the contextual, historical and cultural factors present in every organization, while reducing 
the unpredictability of organizational change.  
To openly show and analyze your failures adds knowledge and enhances a reflexive 
approach and a non-punitive culture in the organization. In that respect, the initially 
unsuccessful project could actually be considered to be the most successful project in SkaS 
Six Sigma programme, contributing to the how-aspects of learning (Tucker et al. 2007). 
8. Further research 
The challenges facing healthcare calls for sustainable changes, necessitating long term 
approaches. The integration of learning mechanisms in the change efforts taking place at 
SkaS but also in other healthcare organizations of the Western Region in Sweden will be 
followed continuously. How learning mechanisms are interpreted and adopted in other 
healthcare systems given their unique culture and history is also a question that deserves 
further investigation. Moreover, can learning mechanism be adopted to alleviate the 
conflicts that often emerge between vertical, hierarchical management structures and 
improvement projects that seek to solve problems pertaining to the value creating horizontal 
patient processes (Hellstrom et al. 2010)? 
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